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Abstract:  With the proliferation of internet-based technologies within and between organisations, large-scale 
enterprise systems are becoming more interconnected than ever before.  A significant problem facing these 
organisations is how their information systems will cope with inconsistency being introduced from external 
data sources.  Major problems arise when low quality information enters an authoritative enterprise system 
from these external sources, and in so doing gains credibility.  This problem is compounded by the 
propagation of this information to other systems and other enterprises, potentially 'invading' an inter-
enterprise network.  In this paper we will introduce and examine this behaviour, which we term 'information 
invasion'.  Characterisation of systems that are most vulnerable from such an occurrence is provided, and 
details of an experiment are given which simulates information invasion on an example network topology.
1 INTRODUCTION 
Information systems within large-scale enterprises 
are becoming increasingly large, complex, 
interconnected and essential to the operation and co-
operation of businesses.  With the advent of this 
information revolution, and as these enterprises open 
up their systems to e-commerce, the volume of 
information that enterprise systems are empowered 
to manage is increasing dramatically.  Such an 
increase in information and interconnectivity 
between enterprise systems introduces new problems 
to which methods and solutions have yet to be found 
(Bichler, Segev & Zhao, 1998; Gray, 1996). 
A major problem faced by such enterprises is 
how to deal with information inconsistency within 
their systems, or put another way, how to survive 
despite this inconsistency existing within their 
systems (Henderson, Walters & Crouch, 2001; 
Anderson et al. 1998).  For example, where 
information is introduced to an enterprise system 
which conflicts with information that is already held, 
how is it decided which contribution to adopt?  The 
new information that has been received may be more 
accurate than the information that is currently held, 
or vice versa.  Knowing which value represents the 
truth would render the problem trivial.  However, 
determining which value is preferred with respect to 
the real world may not be practical given the 
quantity of information handled by enterprise 
systems.  We use the term ‘preferred’ since 
determining the ‘correct’ value may not be possible. 
The cause of this inconsistency might not only be 
information that is introduced into a system from 
within its own organisational process, but also from 
information received from external sources which 
can also pollute the information pool.  It is certainly 
possible that an enterprise could pass on received 
low quality information to other interconnected 
enterprise systems.  A factor that significantly 
compounds this situation is that of authority.  Where 
enterprise systems are considered an ‘authoritative’ 
information source, their ability to spread potentially 
low quality information to other enterprises should 
not be underestimated. 
This paper will illustrate how information 
propagation and authority can together facilitate 
‘information invasion’; a phenomenon that can 
cause debilitating problems within and across inter-
enterprise systems.  Previously, we have 
investigated the effects of various behaviours 
interacting in e-commerce systems (Henderson 
2002; 2003) including negotiation (Henderson et al. 
2003), and in this paper we demonstrate the effects of information invasion with a specified behaviour 
in an experiment. 
2 THE  PHENOMENON  OF 
INFORMATION INVASION 
2.1 Problems within Modern 
Enterprise Systems 
To illustrate the ways in which modern enterprise 
systems can cause real-world problems, a certain 
case provides compelling evidence (Gerth, 2000a; 
2000b).  Because of a bureaucratic mistake, the 
individual, whom we will refer to as John Doe, was 
declared dead.  Because of this, his Social Security 
stipend was stopped, and subsequently his bank 
account frozen.  Additionally, the insurance 
company paying his medical benefits also stopped 
paying claims.  This simple dependency is shown in 
Figure 1. 
Although the bank account was immediately 
unfrozen when the error was brought to light, the 
medical benefits company was unable to restart 
paying claims due to a lack of proper verification 
from the government department.  Interestingly, the 
reason for the mistake was a death certificate for a 
John Doe arriving at the department, although the 
origin behind the erroneous certificate was 
unknown.  Subsequently, this information was 
passed to Doe’s bank and his medical insurance 
company.  However, according to government 
officials at the time, a likely cause for this mistake 
was the death of a John Doe in a nearby county, and 
“that could be a source of confusion”.  A spokesman 
for the insurance company’s regional office stated 
when commenting about Doe’s case that “We can’t 
put him back on until they [the government 
department] reinstate him,” and “yes, it does happen 
from time to time.”  In effect, they lacked the local 
authority to correct the information.  The matter was 
eventually resolved when the government 
department corrected its system, and the insurance 
company received the update. 
Such incidents are not uncommon.  An official 
working in the retirement benefits department for a 
real estate company elaborated on a similar 
occurrence (Haga, 2002), explaining that such 
mistakes happen occasionally when computers at the 
government department “compare their data base to 
ours”.  She added, on the day of interview, that she 
had had “four calls this morning from people who 
were told they’re listed as dead”. 
2.2 Characterising this Behaviour 
The key issue that initially causes these problems, 
and also prevents them from being quickly resolved, 
is the authority of the initial carrier.  Information 
that is received and accepted by such organisations, 
correct or not, is awarded instant credibility due to 
their authoritative position.  This information then 
propagates to other systems dependent on this 
information, and they propagate this information, 
and so on.  When this occurs to the degree that the 
old information is no longer effectively represented 
within an inter-enterprise network, the new 
information has effectively invaded the network; 
hence we term this phenomenon information 
invasion. 
After information invasion has occurred, 
attempting to revert any subservient system’s 
information to the previous value (assuming this is 
possible) is very difficult, for two main reasons: 
 
•  Authoritative top-down propagation:  future 
updates, or database synchronisations, from 
the authoritative source will filter down 
through the inter-enterprise network, 
eventually overwriting any deviation from the 
authoritative system’s spurious view of 
information. 
•  Communal reinforcement: neighbouring 
enterprise systems are in the position to 
reinforce the belief that a certain value 
(possibly the new one) is correct. 
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Figure 1: Information dependency between the government department, the insurance company, and the Bank   Communal reinforcement can be achieved in 
many ways.  For example, databases may be 
synchronised and inconsistent data queried, 
potentially overwriting any attempt to revert.  This is 
a common feature in replication systems (Thompson 
1997).  Another example is an informal query.  A 
system that is attempting a reversion may query 
neighbouring systems directly (or even the 
authoritative source itself) to determine the ‘official’ 
value.  This may be achieved using methods other 
than database synchronisation, such as a telephone 
or email.  In both examples, reverting to a previous 
value can prove difficult, since the network (and 
crucially the authoritative source) collectively 
believes the newly invaded value.  Of course, this 
can make fixing a problem such as Doe’s difficult. 
Time has an obvious impact on the adoption of a 
certain value by an authoritative source, and hence 
on information invasion.  But in essence, if 
something is repeated often enough by the source 
systems, it may eventually be perceived as true by 
the target system.  From a larger perspective, if 
something is repeated often enough within an 
enterprise network, it is likely to be perceived as true 
by the enterprise. 
2.4 Properties of Enterprise Systems 
that Contribute to Information 
Invasion 
In addition to authority, there are other properties of 
interconnected enterprise information systems that 
promote the spread of low quality information due to 
information invasion. 
2.3 Influences on an Authoritative 
Source 
The first of these is interconnectivity: 
  Systems that contribute information to an 
authoritative source clearly have a great influence as 
a potential instigator of information invasion.  With 
many contributing information sources, a critical 
factor that contributes to information invasion is 
time. 
•  Loose coupling: enterprise systems are often 
loosely coupled, where asynchronous methods 
of information transfer are used.  This 
asynchronous functionality is provided by 
many middleware solutions, such as Microsoft 
Message Queue (MSMQ) (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2004), IBM’s WebSphere MQ 
(formerly MQSeries) (IBM Corporation, 
2004), and Sun’s Java Messaging Service 
(JMS) (Sun Microsystems Incorporated, 
2004).  Asynchronous methods greatly 
increase the possibility that while data is in 
transit, it becomes out of date.  The possibility 
exists that out of date information will be 
favoured over existing information simply 
because it arrives later.  Information can also 
arrive out of order, unless transaction methods 
are used.  For example, if two sequential 
updates of someone’s address arrived out of 
order, an information system would end up 
believing the incorrect one. 
Let us consider Figure 2, which depicts an 
enterprise system topology in which three sources 
(A,  B and D) contribute to a single authoritative 
source (C).  Assuming these systems adopt the 
common policy that the latest data received is 
accepted, a significant problem can result: the time 
that information arrives from one of A,  B and D 
dictates what C will believe, and possibly pass on to 
other systems.  If, for example, many systems were 
dependent on C for information, information 
invasion may occur. 
What a system in a network believes, therefore 
(C in our example), is dependent on three key 
factors of its information sources: 
 
•  What information they believe 
•  Their level of authority 
•  Intermittent availability: enterprise 
information systems can be intermittently 
•  In what order (as a group) they pass their 
information on to the receiving system 
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Figure 2: Example inter-enterprise system topology unavailable, perhaps because of workload or 
problems with their connectivity (e.g. the 
internet), either of which may be out of their 
control.  In addition, working practices may 
contribute to system availability (e.g. working 
hours).  Coupled with the first property, there 
is no way to guarantee a system is being 
reliably informed and kept up to date.  
•  Responsibility: there is the ethical problem of 
responsibility.  An enterprise is often 
exclusively concerned with maintaining the 
quality of its own information, and not that of 
others.  They often have little regard, or 
knowledge, of other external information 
systems that house the same information.   
They may also have no obligation to ensure 
their information is consistent with every data 
source, and they often have no responsibility 
to ensure external data sources to which they 
are interconnected are also consistent.  Such 
mentality is predominant, and greatly 
increases the likelihood of inconsistent 
information arising within, and between, such 
enterprise systems. 
 
An issue associated with interconnectivity that 
promotes inconsistency is that of dependency.   
Within a network of interconnected enterprises, an 
enterprise may depend on many other organisations 
for information.  This may mean that one enterprise 
receives several different values for an information 
item.  This increases the possibility of inconsistency 
being introduced and information invasion being 
initiated.  Where authority is not a concern, the level 
of trust awarded to source organisations may form 
part of the selection process for this information, 
although such trust relationships require constant re-
evaluation (Grandison & Sloman 2000; 2002).   
Similarly, there may be many enterprises that are 
dependent on this organisation for information.   
Inconsistent information that exists within the 
supplying system may then be passed to those 
dependent systems, triggering information invasion. 
The methods of information-passing between 
and into enterprises, ‘channels’, can form a 
contributing factor.  It is conceivable that an 
enterprise may receive many different values for a 
data item from a single enterprise through many 
channels: such as email, database synchronisation, 
and other forms of data feed which are not computer 
system-oriented such as postal mail and the 
telephone.  Unfortunately, more informal channels 
are often more unreliable, such as a human 
conversation over the telephone.  Interestingly, 
however, this issue can work both ways.  In such 
situations, humans are able to spot inaccuracies in 
the information and correct them during the 
telephone call, which may not be possible with 
information systems. 
As well as interconnectivity, properties of the 
information that flows through the interconnections 
can promote information invasion.  The quantity and 
frequency of information received from and passed 
to other enterprises increases the possibility of 
inconsistency, and the onset of information invasion.  
The quality of such information can also prove to be 
an issue.  There may be no way to ensure that 
information that is received from other enterprises is 
of the quality required by the receiving organisation. 
An issue that can contribute significantly to 
information invasion is the ownership of information 
systems across enterprises.  Although enterprises 
may be interconnected, such that one or both are 
dependent on the other for information, they are not 
obligated to correct their data if found incorrect by 
the other enterprise.  An enterprise may realise a 
data partner’s information is partially incorrect, but 
simply does not possess the authority to correct the 
information in their partner’s systems.   
Unfortunately, this can lead to the incorrect 
information entering their systems over and over 
again; continually overwriting corrected data 
(McLaughlin & Krishnamurthy 2003). 
3 THE  EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Overview 
In order to understand how information invasion 
affects information networks where authoritative 
sources are present, we constructed an 
environmental framework and corresponding 
implementation in which networks of different 
information handling behaviours could be specified 
and simulated.  This enabled the simulation of 
scenarios more complex than that of Doe.  Many 
simulations were executed, and the results of one of 
these experiments will be covered in this paper. 
Networks of individual information systems or, 
abstractly, whole enterprises, are represented as 
individual information ‘nodes’.  This allows us to 
conduct information invasion experiments at either 
the intra-enterprise or inter-enterprise level.  In 
addition, each node is assigned a numerical measure 
that indicates the relative authority of that node with 
respect to the rest of the network. Connections between nodes are modelled as 
queues.  This asynchronous model provides a 
number of advantages.  From an intra-enterprise 
perspective, queuing systems are commonly used on 
enterprise servers to log incoming requests.  From an 
inter-enterprise viewpoint, the queues effectively 
simulate the delay between information being sent to 
an enterprise (via various channels) and being 
received and handled by that enterprise.  Moreover, 
an asynchronous model provides another realistic 
degree of uncertainty in that messages can be 
received in an order other than the order in which 
they were sent.  Therefore, a queuing model awards 
a realistic abstraction of both perspectives. 
•  Proactive rate represents a node’s maximum 
time in-between sending message(s) to others 
(in milliseconds). 
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Figure 3: Graph representation of an example information network 
 
A node’s reactive and proactive rates represent 
maximum times between each respective activity; in 
other words, the maximum intervals between two 
reactive tasks or two proactive tasks.  The time that 
event tn+1 occurs is defined as: 
 
tn+1 = tn + random(1… r) 
 
Where  tn represents the time at which task n 
occurred, r represents the maximum reactive rate for 
a node, and random(a,b) is a function that returns a 
random value between a and b inclusive.  Specifying 
reactive and proactive intervals in this manner 
models a node responding to received input and 
sending data to others within time boundaries. 
In addition to specified behaviour (see section 
3.3), each node defined in this framework requires 
the following parameters to be specified: 
 
•  Authority the relative strength of influence the 
node has on other nodes it informs of its belief.   The structure of an information network in the 
simulation is a non-negative, unweighted, directed 
and partially connected graph.  Nodes are vertices 
{N1, N2, … Nm} where m is the number of nodes, and 
each node contains a set of links to dependent nodes, 
represented as {Na.L1, Na.L2, … Na.LNa.d} where a is 
the number of the node and Na.d represents that 
node’s total number of dependent nodes.  An 
•  Initial belief what the node believes before the 
simulation is initiated. 
•  Information dependents list of other nodes 
that a node can elect to inform of its belief. 
•  Reactive rate represents a node’s maximum 
time in-between handling message(s) in its 
queue (in milliseconds). 
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Figure 4: A network topology 4.1 Experiment Results 
Table 1 shows the results for this experiment. 
Table 1:  Results from the experiment 
Node Sim1 Sim2 Sim3  Avg.
N1  0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
N2  0.47 0.42 0.48 0.46
N3  0.46 0.45 0.42 0.44
N4  0.49 0.45 0.38 0.44
N5  0.28 0.45 0.29 0.34
N6  0.39 0.38 0.20 0.32
N7  0.16 0.37 0.10 0.21
N8  0.13 0.32 0.06 0.17
N9  0.18 0.38 0.10 0.22
N10 0.31 0.32 0.09 0.24
N11 0.41 0.38 0.20 0.33
N12 0 0 0 0
Avg. 0.32 0.37 0.24 0.31
StDev.  0.17 0.13 0.18 0.15
 
By looking at the (Avg., Sim1-Sim3) cells we 
can determine the overall impact of introducing blue 
into each simulation scenario.  Simulation one 
provides a baseline to which we can compare the 
other two simulations, since the proactive and 
reactive rates are equal.  The results are counter to 
what we may expect. 
In simulation two, we might naively expect blue 
to propagate more slowly throughout the network, 
due to the lower proactive rate, but this is not what 
transpires.  We can see that the network as a whole 
believed the invading value 37% of the time.  This is 
5% more than in the first simulation, where the 
proactive rate was as fast as the reactive rate.  This 
counter-intuitive behaviour is due to the queues of 
the nodes in the network filling up slower as a 
consequence of all nodes’ slower proactive rate.   
Yellow, therefore, does not exist in any great 
quantity in any node’s queue, if at all, before blue is 
introduced.  As a result, when blue enters a node’s 
queue, it has a greater chance of being selected by 
the reactive function.  After which, of course, it will 
not revert due to blue’s higher authority.  However, 
although initially counter-intuitive, this is true to the 
notion of information invasion.  In simulation one, 
communal reinforcement of yellow at the start of the 
simulation occurred at a greater rate than in 
simulation two, due to the higher proactive rate, 
therefore increasing the chance that yellow was 
selected.  In real terms, this means an enterprise 
system that conforms to our specified behaviour and 
consumes less potentially conflicting information 
from other sources is more prone to information 
invasion.  Such a system is more likely to believe the 
newly invading value. 
In simulation three, the reactive rate is slower 
than the proactive rate.  As a consequence, the 
queues effectively ‘stockpile’ received yellow 
beliefs before blue is introduced.  This means that if 
a blue arrives in a node’s queue, it has a reduced 
chance of being read and set as believed.  Therefore, 
blue becomes little more than ‘noise’ among the 
dominant yellow.  However, when blue is eventually 
received and believed by a node, it is propagated as 
in simulation one.  Information invasion occurs as 
expected, although in the final analysis, with 8% less 
impact.  An enterprise is less likely to contribute to 
information invasion if it responds to its queues 
infrequently. 
4.2 Other Results 
Other experiments have yielded interesting results 
which hold true to our observations.  In an 
experiment where both N1 and N12 in our topology 
are equally authoritative and possess different belief 
values, a state of eternal conflict can result.  Each 
node in the network will believe either value, and so 
information invasion cannot successfully occur.  The 
beliefs of the network will never acquiesce to a 
single value.  Where simulation three was executed 
in this scenario, the behaviour of each node’s belief 
over time became chaotic.  Initially, information 
invasion is clearly observed originating from both 
authoritative sources, but because of the slow 
reactive rates of the nodes, the queues become filled 
with both possible beliefs.  Even when the 
inconsistency in beliefs appears to have resolved to a 
single value over the entire network, and communal 
reinforcement is maintaining this value, the other 
value still exists within the queues.  This can mean 
that inconsistency can still potentially arise at any 
time.  However, in simulation two, where the queues 
are less full, and occasionally empty, the 
propagation of beliefs is more predictable. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  AND  FURTHER 
WORK 
With information system network topologies 
becoming more populated and interconnected 
(Bichler, Segev & Zhao 1998), information invasion 
will become more widespread and harder to fix.  In 
addition, as information becomes more a 
commodity, the possibility of low quality 
information being introduced into such networks 
becomes a greater risk.  We have introduced the concept of information invasion as a natural 
phenomenon that needs to be recognised and 
understood if problems such as those experienced by 
Doe are to be properly resolved. 
We have detailed an experiment in information 
invasion that has presented some unexpected results.  
Of particular interest is the finding in our 
experiments that decreasing the rate of belief 
propagation within a topology of enterprise systems 
actually increases the rate of information invasion.  
This is provided that a dominant belief existed 
within the network before the new belief was 
introduced.  Information is able to invade an 
information domain more efficiently.  The 
simulation counter to this where queue reading rates 
were faster confirms this finding.  In such a scenario, 
the faster belief propagation rate hindered the 
invasion of the new belief. 
Inevitably, reality places some constraints upon 
solutions to alleviate some of the discussed 
problems.  Consider the eternal conflict experiment 
as outlined in section 4.2. If we stop proactivity (the 
sending of information) altogether during an 
execution of simulation two until eventually the 
queues become empty, its execution becomes less 
chaotic and more predictable.  The same would be 
true if we had just emptied the queues by throwing 
away the messages.  Of course, in reality this is both 
impossible and undesirable.  It is not always possible 
to prevent other enterprises sending an enterprise 
information, and we obviously have no control over 
all information in transit, especially non-machine 
oriented methods such as postal mail.  Naturally this 
may not be desirable in any case, since throwing 
away new information can mean throwing away 
business. 
Exacerbating the phenomenon of information 
invasion is the issue of the lack of responsibility and 
accountability for information system accidents that 
needs to be addressed (Nissenbaum, 1996; 2001).   
Currently, in the large, enterprises are not obliged to 
ensure their data is accurate before passing it on.   
Nor are they accountable in many cases for 
originating inaccurate information.  Such 
occurrences are simply considered unfortunate 
mistakes.  A lack of local authority can also mean 
remedying problems caused by information invasion 
are impossible.  In Doe’s case, he was able to 
convince the insurance company of his ‘alive’ status 
yet they were unable to fix the problem despite this. 
However, various means to address these current 
attitudes and approaches to information present 
themselves, and require consideration and 
investigation. 
Firstly, it is not difficult to imagine a common 
process that is adopted by all those participating in 
an information domain that is triggered when there 
is a query regarding the accuracy of some 
information upon discovering an inconsistency.   
When this occurs, all participants, including the 
authoritative source, engage in a discussion to agree 
on the value of the disputed information.  This 
process could even be automated, utilising a 
common negotiation framework (Jennings et al, 
1998; 2000). 
A second approach concerns the traceability of 
information, in order to identify the original, perhaps 
authoritative, source.  One method of achieving this 
traceability is to tag all passed-on information with 
historical metadata.  Each time an item of 
information is received and accepted by an 
enterprise, it appends it’s own identity.  Any 
amendments to the data are also added to the 
metadata with time information.  In effect, this 
metadata encapsulates the information’s entire 
lifecycle.  By examining this metadata, observers not 
only have access to the origin of potentially 
inconsistent information, but are also able to 
ascertain other properties of the information, such as 
how regularly and frequently it changes.  However, 
this approach is not without obvious issues that need 
to be addressed, such as security (altering metadata 
to avoid or implicate responsibility), information 
size (over time, the size of the metadata could 
become unmanageable), and metadata inconsistency 
(the potentially huge task of reconciling inconsistent 
metadata).  A more simple, but less powerful, 
method of introducing traceability would be for 
organisations to specifically maintain their database 
audit information for this purpose.  This information 
is then provided subject to an appropriate and 
validated request.  This could also be an automated 
process, perhaps provided by a secure web service. 
An approach to address the issue of 
responsibility consists of the notion of an 
information responsibility contract, where 
enterprises that are involved in sharing information 
between themselves in a loosely-coupled manner 
agree to be directly responsible for information they 
pass on to their contract partners.  Such a contract 
would highlight areas of responsibility for different 
types of information, depending on origin.  This 
would encourage individual partners to be more 
proactive in ensuring their information is up-to-date 
before they pass it on, provide accountability, 
perhaps even liability, for mistakes, and help to 
ameliorate the ‘denial of accountability’ attitude 
(Nissenbaum, 1996) that can exist in such 
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